

OneWhiting Tailgate Discussion



WEEK OF 09/20/2010

This Weeks' Incidents

Environmental Incidents

- September 7 - VRU 300 lost 100# steam pressure due to a boiler shutdown at Whiting Clean Energy (see Process Safety Events below). As a result of the low steam pressure, K-351 steam turbine slowed down to minimum governor speed which resulted in the flaring of the wet gas system. The flaring event resulted in agency notifications for SO₂ and H₂S RQ exceedances.

Process Safety Events / PSII

- September 7 - At approximately 10:30 a.m. the refinery lost all steam from Whiting Clean Energy. Several steam turbines tripped as a result and units de-pressured to the closed flare systems as designed. The WCCC Coordinator initiated the "steam shed" procedure resulting in several unit slowdowns, some unit shutdowns and a precautionary evacuation of personnel over many parts of the plant. Throughout the event nobody was injured and there were no uncontrolled releases or damage to equipment (**GREAT JOB by everyone involved**).
- September 7 - Asphalt loader at C-Rack was loading a railcar. The car was getting close to the top, so the loader left to open another railcar and did not return in time to prevent an overfill; which resulted in 82 gallons of asphalt onto the ground (LOPC - Severity Level G).

Excavating Near Foundations

WHAT HAPPENED

(Cherry Point Refinery) On February 17, 2010, excavations for the Sour Water Project were underway in the vicinity of two operating VFD (Variable Frequency Drives) cabinets. During the excavation, unstable soil shifted from under the VFD cabinets requiring the contractors to stabilize them by tying them off to a beam supported by nearby pipe rack. This was done without advising operations or the AA. Subsequently a unit operator saw the supported cabinets and stopped the work until the situation could be assessed by experts. The situation was found to be stable, but as an extra precaution, two channels were added under the VFD cabinets and the rigging eased to improve the stability.

(Whiting Refinery) On June 9, 2009 a WBU operator was called to site to witness a dead hydrocarbon line hot tapping per the A-7 policy. The operator noticed an excavation located against the foundation of a high voltage line tower. He stopped the job and contacted the Area authority. It was later found that the excavation drawings did not show the foundation and verbal instructions limiting the depth of the excavation against the foundation to 8' were not followed and the excavation had ultimately reached a depth of 12-13'.

LESSON

- In both instances, the scope of work changed from what was planned but was not properly communicated or re-evaluated for risk.
- In both instances it was an operator performing normal duties who identified the potential issue and STOPPED the WORK.**

- In Whiting, important information and restrictions for work activities were not properly documented in the CoW process.



DISSCUSION

- What tools do we have in place to prevent this type of incident from happening?
- How consistently are these types of hazards captured during the HITRA process?
- At what point does scope creep become a change in scope which requires a re-evaluation of the hazards?
- In your area, how often does the scope of work change and when it does, is a re-evaluation triggered.